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Criticism of current agricultural programs is  ture cannot achieve the multiple and frequent-
coming  from  within  and  outside  agriculture.  ly  conflicting  objectives  of  producers,  con-
Secretary Bergland in recent "grassroots hear-  sumers, and taxpayers. Further,  the problems
ings" has called for new approaches  in agricul-  are not due to poor leadership but are inherent
tural policy  in which recipient benefits  do not  in  the nature of the programs.  Although  fed-
hinge on size of farming operation.'  Hjort sug-  eral programs in agriculture, like those in other
gests  that despite  widespread  agreement  on  areas,  are  often  instituted  to  overcome  prob-
the objective  of encouraging  the family farm,  lems caused by "market failure,"  problems due
"the cumulative  effect  of our  farm programs  to program deficiencies or "nonmarket failure"
may well  have  been to  hasten the concentra-  are equally pervasive and serious. 3
tion of the farm sector...."  (Hjort, p. 748). Pro-  This  article  has three  objectives.  First, the
ducers of flue-cured  tobacco voted overwhelm-  major  purposes  of current  price  support  pro-
ingly in December 1979 to continue a program  grams are briefly  contrasted with program re-
but are upset about  high quota  rental prices.2 sults.  Second,  inherent  features  of  the  pro-
Outside  agriculture,  consumers  are  unhappy  grams  which  cause results to fall  short of ex-
about the effects of farm programs on prices of  pectations  are  discussed.  Finally,  the  policy
milk,  sugar,  and  other  products.  Students  of  implications  of  the  article  for  southern
the political process are concerned about the ef-  commodities are briefly explored.
fects of the use of state power by small, politic-
ally powerful groups to secure economic gains.
What are the reasons for the dissatisfaction?  MAJOR  PURPOSE  AND  EFFECTS  OF
Are  the problems  due  to poor administration  CURRENT  FEDERAL PROGRAMS'
as  alleged  by  Ralph  Nader  in  other  areas  of
economic  regulation?  Or  are  there  inherent  The preamble  of  every  farm  bill  since  the
problems  in  the  nature  of  the  programs?  1930s  has contained  the  explicit  objective  of
MacAvoy (1979), after analyzing findings from  helping the family farm (Laferney and Penn, p.
a  wide  range  of  studies,  found  that  conven-  809).  Although strengthening  the family  farm
tional  regulation  in nonagricultural  areas  has  may  have  been  an  important  objective,  the
not  achieved  its  stated  purpose,  but  has  in-  dominant  purpose  of  federal  programs  from
stead reduced  the quality and quantity of out-  the standpoint of many producers has been to
put  in  directly  affected  industries.  He  con-  "improve"  income distribution, i.e., to increase
cludes  (1970)  that the failure  of  regulation  is  income  of  farmers  in relation  to that  of  non-
not due to inept leadership but to problems in-  farmers.
herent in current methods of regulation.  A  cartel  is a  group  of producers  acting to-
Studies  of  government  regulation  in  other  gether  to  restrict  competition,  and  any
areas  appear  to be  instructive  in agriculture.  successful cartel is expected  to affect the level
The thesis of this article is that federal price sup-  of income  to the affected  group as well as the
port and market  control programs  in agricul-  distribution  of  income.  What  has  been  the
E. C. Pasour, Jr., is Professor of Economics and Business,  North Carolina State University.
Invited paper, meeting of Southern Agricultural Economics Association, February 5, 1980,  Hot Springs, Arkansas.
The author thanks D. S. Ball, D.  M. Hoover, L. A. Ihnen, C. R. Pugh, and the anonymous Journal  reviewers for helpful comments and suggestions.
"'Secretary Bergland has been reported as saying, 'It  provides too many benefits to the largest farmers who need them the least' "  (Progressive  Farmer,  p. 130).
'As  a grower recently stated, "When you have to give somebody a third of the gross for the privilege of growing tobacco, you know there's something wrong with
the system" (Bickers, p. 26).
Iln a recent analysis of government regulations in the beef industry, for example, 84 regulatory issues were investigated.  It  was estimated that only 36 resulted  in a
net positive social  benefit, whereas 27  had a negative impact and 21  had no significant  effect  (CAST, p.  1). Fisher contends that government protection and aid to
milk,  egg, and hops producers in Great Britain have been counterproductive in terms of producer interests.
'The following discussion of agricultural programs and program effects is not intended to be exhaustive.  The first part of the article is concerned primarily with the
effects  of federal price support programs on income distribution  and  an allotment  and land values.  In  addition to these effects, federal  research, regulatory,  and
commodity programs have important resource allocation effects.  The discussion of "nonmarket failure" elsewhere  in the article is relevant to government  interven-
tion whether to "improve" income distribution or to increase the efficiency of resource use.
29effect  of  government-sanctioned  cartels  on  Although there is a near consensus that the
income?  First, consider the effect on overall re-  dominant  purpose  of peanut,  tobacco,  and
turns.  A  group  of  competitive  producers,  if  other  government-sanctioned  cartels  is  to  in-
they  successfully collude,  can increase returns  crease net producer returns, there is no consen-
to the group by restricting production  and in-  sus about their actual effects. Lamm found in a
creasing  price  (Figure  1).6  The  competitive  recent  study that the peanut control  program
did increase net producer income. This result is
FIGURE  1.  Effect  of  Cartel  on  Price  and  predictable  on  the  basis  of  cartel  theory,  at
Quantity  least in the short run. The  long-run impact  of
cartel  pricing  on  net  producer  returns,  how-
ever, is much less predictable. 6
The  effects  of  government  programs  on
\=  3.,~  ^income  distribution  are  difficult  to  isolate.
XS= /  MCj  However, one specific effect is that commodity
programs based on volume of production yield
pm  -.- y.\  @  /larger  benefits to larger producers.'  Moreover,
m\  :\  /  as a result of  these programs  which result  in
--- higher prices  of milk, sugar, tobacco,  peanuts,
and other products, many low income consum-
ers subsidize agricultural  producers who have
relatively higher incomes.
\I8^~~~  \  J  \I  As one fairly  clear-cut example of the effect
\  MR  \  D  of  government  programs  on  income  distribu-
--- I——/  '-Q/u.t.  tion,  consider  the  case  of  direct  government
0  _  m  Q4c  payments to farmers.  In  1978, per farm direct
payments  averaged  more  than  $2,000  for
equilibrium  given  by  the  intersection  of  the  farms  with  sales  exceeding  $20,000  per  year
industry  supply and demand  curves  does  not  but  averaged  less  than  $500  for  farms  with
maximize  the  income  of  all  firms  taken  sales of less than $20,000 per year (USDA,  p.
together.  If firms act together and reduce  out-  61).  When one  takes  the  much higher  net  in-
put from  OQ,  to OQm where marginal revenue  come  per  farm  operator  family  on  the  larger
equals  marginal  cost  (and  where  price  is  farms into  account,  it seems  clear why  Secre-
increased  from  OP,  to  OPm),  income  will  be  tary Bergland is concerned  about the distribu-
maximized (Becker, 1971, p. 99).  tion of benefits.
A cartel,  as suggested by Figure 1, might be  Consider next the close relationship between
expected to operate in the elastic portion of the  government programs and land values. Rapid-
demand  curve.  In  reality,  because  of  fear  of  ly increasing capital requirements  have impli-
political  retribution,  concern  about  loss  of  cations  for  entry  into  agriculture.  Further-
political  support  and  development  of  substi-  more,  federal  programs  as in the  case  of pea-
tutes, etc.,  the cartel may not restrict produc-  nuts and tobacco have  contributed  to rapidly
tion (or raise price above the competitive level)  increasing land costs (Bullock, Nieuwoudt, and
as much as indicated  in Figure  1. It  is  a moot  Pasour; Seagraves and Manning).8
point in the case of agricultural supply control  Consider the effect of an increase in the level
programs,  for  example,  whether  producer  re-  of price supports,  ceteris paribus, for tobacco.
turns over time would be increased  by further  The  greater the extent to which product price
restrictions  on current  production.  In  reality,  is supported  above the market clearing  price,
of course, the cartel is not given information on  the higher will be the value of the right to pro-
present  or  future  market  and  political  condi-  duce,  i.e.,  the allotment  value.  Moreover,  the
tions  and  operates  as  a  "price  searcher"  in  increase  in allotment value  increases producer
attempting  to  determine  the  optimal  produc-  costs  regardless  of  whether  the  allotment  is
tion and marketing strategy.  owned  or  rented.  Competition  will  tend  to
"There are problems with this  conclusion.  First, the potential long-run gains to the cartel hinge on the closeness  and availability  of substitutes. The less elastic the
product demand,  the greater are the potential gains. Over time,  the demand for most products becomes more elastic as substitutes are developed and consumers have
greater opportunities  to substitute. Second,  the conclusion  ignores the question of the distribution of potential  gains among producers.  Specifically,  it ignores the
effects of the cartel on the incomes of excluded producers.
'In  cases where exports are important, price  increases achieved by restrictions on production  may reduce income  from exports more than enough to offset income
increases due to domestic price increases.  Furthermore,  increases in price (as in the case of cotton price supports) are  likely to encourage  the development  and adop-
tion of substitutes.  In the long run, a mandated  price increase may increase the elasticity of  demand enough that the returns to the cartel  are less than would be ob- tained in the absence of the cartel.
7In  the case of  peanuts and  tobacco,  there has  been  a consolidation of operating units  through allotment rentals.  Because quota returns  accrue  mainly to quota
owners, the effect of allotment rentals is to smooth the distribution of program benefits.
'Monetary and fiscal policies of the federal government,  as discussed elsewhere in this article,  have also been important in increasing  the demand for land and other real assets as hedges against inflation.
30bring  about  an  increase  in  allotment  rental  The costs of production rights to potential pro-
values and land values until the expected rate  ducers, at the margin, are equal to the expected
of  return  on  investments  in  these  assets  is  benefits. The outlays incurred by producers  in
again  comparable with that of investments  in  purchasing  or renting  allotments  and  other
other assets of comparable risk.9 production rights may, in a manner analogous
The phenomenon  of program  benefits  being  to  that  described  by  Posner,  be  viewed  as
capitalized  into input prices  has  been  charac-  economic waste.
terized by Tullock  (1975)  as  the "transitional
gains  trap."  Price  support  programs,  for  EXPECTATIONS  VERSUS
example,  generate  transitional  gains  for  pro-  ACTUAL  RESULTS
ducers in the industry when the programs are
initiated.  When  these  gains  have  been  fully  Many  economic  studies  in  the  last  decade
capitalized,  costs of allotments,  land, and other  have  shown  that  the  effects  of  government
specialized  resources  are increased  so that the  regulation are typically not consistent with the
expected  rate  of  return  is  no  higher  than  stated purpose.  Stigler's thesis is that regula-
normal.  Thus,  later  entrants  who  must  pur-  tory  agencies  ostensibly  designed  to  protect
chase  production rights  receive  little  benefit.  the "public interest"  are generally "captured"
Moreover,  if  such  a  program  is  terminated,  by the industry involved.10 Older regulation or-
owners  of  specialized  resources-primarily  ganized  on  an  industry-by-industry  basis,  as
land and allotments-will incur large losses.  embodied in the Interstate Commerce Commis-
The  magnitude  of  the  "trap"  created  by  sion, the Civil Aeronautics  Board, and occupa-
state grants of monopoly power in agriculture  tional  licensing,  supposedly  was  enacted  to
is illustrated by the case of flue-cured  tobacco.  protect the public but often promotes the inter-
The production quota in 1979 was  about 1 bil-  ests  of the regulated  group at the  expense  of
lion pounds (Pugh). The average rental value of  the public at large.
quota in North Carolina was about 40 cents per  Is the Stigler hypothesis  applicable to feder-
pound  (but  varied  among  counties  because  al programs in agriculture? Are price supports,
leasing  and  transfer,  a  predominant  type  of  market controls, and other federal programs in
rental,  is restricted  to  county  lines).  Thus,  a  agriculture  designed  to  further  the  "public
windfall loss of $400  million per year would be  interest"  by  protecting  and  benefiting  the
imposed  on  allotment  owners  if  the  tobacco  public at large?  Or is it more realistic  to view
price  support program  were terminated.  Once  these  programs  as  attempts  by  agricultural
a program is begun and the benefits  are  capi-  producers to enhance their own economic inter-
talized into the prices of production rights and  ests by controlling entry (or otherwise restrict-
other  specialized  inputs,  there  is  no  way  to  ing competition)?  The burden of proof appears
avoid this "trap."  to  be  on  those  who  contend  that  the  federal
The concept "transitional gains trap" is very  programs in agriculture are somehow different
closely  related  to  the  "rent-seeking"  theory  from federal  programs in  many  other  sectors
developed by Tullock (1967) and Posner. When  which  serve  to  enhance  the  incomes  of  the
politics  creates  profit  opportunities,  invest-  regulated groups.
ment will take the form  of attempts  to  secure  Much  special interest  legislation  can  be  ex-
access  to the profits. Posner contends that ob-  plained  in  terms  of  costs  and  benefits  to
taining and maintaining  a monopoly is itself a  particular groups. The benefits of special inter-
competitive  activity  and that,  at the margin,  est  legislation  are  generally  concentrated
the costs of obtaining the monopoly are equal  whereas  the  costs  are  widely  diffused.  The
to  the  benefits  so  that  these  outlays  are  benefits,  for  example,  of  the  sugar  price
economically  unproductive.  This  theory  support  program  which  results  in  domestic
appears  to  be  an  accurate  description  of  the  sugar prices  being  more than twice the  world
effects  of  allotments  and  other  production  market price, are very important to the 15,000
rights  in  agriculture  for  on-going  programs.  sugar producers in the United States.'  Yet our
'Federal programs to increase incomes  of agricultural producers are sometimes justified  on the basis of  the "cost-price  squeeze."  The implied assumption is  that
government assistance will no  longer be required when  the rate of return on  investments  in agricultural production  exceeds  that in other areas.  Competition  in agricul-
ture, however, means that there will always be a cost-price squeeze regardless of the levels  of support prices or direct assistance.
'° In Stigler's words:  "We propose the general hypothesis:  every industry or occupation that has enough political power to utilize the state will seek to control
entry"  (Stigler, p. 5). The  theory of self-interest  in politics  ignores the  effect of ideology. Most economists appear  to think  that ideas  are important  in influencing  legis-
lation, and research reports in economics  often conclude with policy implications. However,  policy prescription is useful only if research findings  are, in fact, relevant
in formulating policy. Kau and Rubin,  in a recent analysis of congressional  voting behavior, conclude that "ideology is significant in explaining voting by congress-
men on bills  with primarily economic  components. ... There appears to be something that is significantly  and systematically associated  with voting which correlates
with the ratings given to congressmen by ideological groups" (p. 384).
"Bosworth  graphically  describes  sugar legislation  as  an example  of  how  political  power  of  a  special interest  group  can  influence  the  legislative  process. "A
politician is tempted always to vote for the special interest.... There are 15,000  sugar producers in this country. There are 220  million consumers.  You would think the
outcome of a bill to more than double the current price of sugar would be obvious. We could get sugar for 7¢  on world markets,  the President offered  15¢ to domestic
producers, they are asking for around 19 or 20¢. Why is  it that those bills get as far as they do? Because  there are 15,000  sugar producers who do not care  about any
other issue short  of war. Those 220  million sugar consumers  will never  know what  hit them. Nobody  is going to change  his vote for his Congressman  depending  on
how he voted on the sugar legislation" (pp. 796-7).
31expenditures  on sugar as individual consumers  Recent  work  in  public  choice  and  the
are  low enough  that it is not  in our  economic  economics  of  information  has  exposed  the
interest as individuals to devote much time to  tenuous  basis  of  many  policy  recommenda-
sugar  legislation.  The  same  phenomenon  of  tions  concerning  spillover  problems.  Real
highly  concentrated  benefits  and  widely  dif-  world  markets  are  imperfect  but  so  are  real
fused  costs  appears  to hold  for  much  of the  world  political  institutions  when  measured
government intervention in agriculture (and in  against  textbook  models  of  democracy.  That
other areas).  is,  there is "government  failure"  in the sense
Despite the fact that the state is often used  that  the  political  process  is  imperfect  in
by  politically  powerful  groups  to  restrict  comparison with an idealized  polity. Thus, the
competition,  economists  have  been  ingenious  fundamental problem is one of comparative  in-
in devising theoretical arguments  that can  be  stitutional  choice  (Demsetz).  Will  real  world
used to justify this intervention.12 To what ex-  markets or real world political institutions bet-
tent are the widely cited  reasons for interven-  ter handle externalities  and other alleged prob-
tion  applicable  in  agriculture?  Public  goods  lems of "market failure?"
theory  has  recently  been  proposed  by  Externalities,  consumer  ignorance,  fraud,
Hochman and Rodgers as a basis for "Pareto  and  monopoly  often discussed by  economists
Optimal"  income  redistribution.  When  Jones  as  "market  imperfections"  are  no less impor-
makes  a  contribution  to  a  poor  person,  the  tant in the political arena.  1  The private sector
charitable act benefits not only Jones but other  certainly  has  no  monopoly  on  erroneous  and
people  who  share Jones'  charitable  impulse.  misleading  information.  How  many  political
Thus,  Hochman  and  Rodgers  argue  that  the  speeches,  for  example,  could  meet  the  stan-
level  of  voluntary  charity  is  suboptimal  and  dards imposed  on advertisements  of commer-
that government intervention  is warranted to  cial  products  by  the  FTC?  Information  is
overcome this "free-rider  problem"  associated  always scarce and costly but information prob-
with  voluntary  charity.  The  redistribution  lems  appear  to  be  even  more  severe  in  the
associated  with  federal  programs  in  political  sphere.  Most  citizens  "grope  in  the
agriculture  which  increase farm  income,  how-  dark"  in  choosing  among  various  political
ever,  cannot be justified on the basis of public  parties, candidates, and programs. The reason
goods  theory.  The  previously  cited  data  on  is clear when one considers the costs and bene-
direct  government  payments  to  farmers  are  fits of voting. The costs of informed voting to
not  consistent with the norms  of Pareto  opti-  the individual  are  overwhelming  but  the  ex-
mal  redistribution  which  hold  that transfers  pected  benefits  from  the  marginal  vote  are
flow solely or largely from higher to  lower in-  small. In facing an all or nothing option, voters
come groups.  Income transfers  in agriculture,  are denied the marginal choices  of consumers
as in other sectors,  are generally to politically  in  the  market.  However,  citizens  obtain  the
powerful groups not defined by income.'3 benefits of public action regardless  of whether
they vote.
Political Failure  Furthermore,  recipients  of  goods  and  ser-
vices  provided  collectively  cannot  readily In recent years, environmental  externalities  ves  ovded  collectively  cannot  readily evaluate  goods  and  services  when  no  direct have  increasingly  been used to justify  a wide  eaate  oods  anen  iret payment is made or when payments bear little range of state activity.  There is alleged  to be
"market  failure"  because  real  world  markets  relationship to opportunity costs (Mitchell).  In "market  failure"  because  real  world  markets  f  t  ci  i  little  information
do not conform  to the idealized  model  of per-  fact  te  cte  is provided  e  no  aon
about  most  collectively  provided  goods  and fect competition.  Consider the following state-  aot  most  collectel  prove  oos  an ment  about  environmental  regulation  services.  What, for example,  are the economic
a  e  r  and political implications  of attempts  to allo-
"And  we,  as economists,  using concepts  cate  land  resources  through  administrative
such as market failure,  externalities,  and  land  use  controls?  How  much  will  prices  of
public goods (or bads) ... can demonstrate  land  for  housing  and  other  urban  uses  be
that society  is better  off if government  increased by actions which "preserve"  agricul-
constrains  the  private  sector  than  if it  tural  land?  If  the  price  signals  of  the  land
does not" (Seitz, p. 818).  market are  consciously  disregarded,  how  will
""There is a pervasive intellectual and popular commitment  to the belief that the failures of the market are the primary  source of that which is wrong with the
economy. Each interest group has its own agenda  of such market failures. To overcome them, an increasing number of organized groups seek protection and redress
by means of public programs and institutions  created by government....  The resulting modifications  of the political economy in general  do not correct actual market
failures but tend to bring about other forms of economic failures. My concern  on this point is that in part by design but mainly unwittingly  some of the specialized
research in departments of economics  supports this special interest fragmentation of the economy  by means of government intervention" (Schultz, 1979, pp.  14-15).
'SThese  groups include among others textile and  steel manufacturers,  labor unions, college  students, older people,  "and  in all probability,  the intellectual class"
(Tullock, 1971, p. 383). Thus, public goods theory does not appear to justify income transfers by the state.
"Externalities  are usually discussed  in terms of market goods and services. However,  externalities are also widespread  in nonmarket decisions. There is  always a
dissatisfied minority when political decisions are made on the basis  of any decision-making  rule other than the rule of unanimity.  An externality  is inherent when
decisions are made on the basis of majority rule because members in the minority must accede  to actions favored by the majority  which they cannot prevent or re-
ceive compensation for.
32planners  determine  the  pattern  of  land  use  retical  standpoint  (Pasour).  In  a  world  of
which is in the "public interest?"  In land use  specialized  factors including land and produc-
and  all  other  areas,  the  citizen  must  make  tion  rights,  costs  cannot  be determined  inde-
political decisions on the basis of fragmentary  pendently  of  product  price  (Friedman).  As
data.  support price is increased,  the increase is capit-
The theory of nonmarket  failure is an impor-  alized  into higher allotment  values  and other
tant corrective  for the implicit  assumption  in  production costs, and the best estimate of pro-
conventional  analysis  of perfectly  functioning  duction cost under these conditions is product
governments."5 Imperfections  appear to be no  price!  Yet  economists  devote  countless  man-
less  important in the political  sphere than  in  days  to theoretically  indefensible  attempts to
the market sector. Thus, as Becker (1958) sug-  estimate  production  costs  empirically  as  a
gests,  it  may  be  preferable  not  to  regulate  basis for agricultural price supports.
economic activity and to suffer the bad effects
rather than to regulate and suffer the effects of
political imperfections.  At any rate, real world  IMPLICATIONS  FOR
markets  should  be compared  with real  world  SOUTHERN  COMMODITIES
political institutions and not with an idealized
polity.16 The  predictable  response  to  the  preceding
discussion  is,  "Don't  criticize  current  pro-
grams unless  you can recommend  a better set
Implementation Problems  of  programs."  It  is  not  the  purpose  of  this
article  to propose  an  array  of new  programs.
The theory of nonmarket  failure is crucial  in  The following comments, suggestive in nature,
explaining why actual program results so often  imply  that  a  superior  alternative  does  not
fall short of expectations. Wolfe points out the  necessarily involve special programs on a com-
kinds  of  problems  often  ignored  in  program  modity-by-commodity  basis.  Indeed,  there  is
implementation.  much  evidence  that  our  current  national
economic problems have been caused or exacer-
"Even the most sophisticated policy anal-  bated  by  the  concerns  of  various  interest
ysis  usually  neglects  implementation  groups leading to a tug-of-war for shares of the
issues.  Policy  studies rarely raise, and al-  income  pie.17 More  attention  to this  inherent
most  never  answer,  such  questions  as  political  problem  of  democracy  is  sorely
who would  have to  do  what, and  when,  needed.  8
and  with  what  foreseeable  resistance,  What are  the implications  of the preceding
modifications,  and compromises  if  alter-  analysis? First, consider land prices in agricul-
native A were chosen, or B, or C ...? Anal-  ture.  Despite  widespread  concern within gov-
ysts implicitly assume that the costs and  ernment  about  rising  land  prices,  federal
benefits,  as modeled in the analysis,  will  policies  encourage  land  price  increases.  Be-
not  be  altered  by  implementation"  (p.  cause much of the increase in land prices can be
132).  attributed  to  inflation,  the  most  effective
policy on the part of the federal government to
The significance  of problems related to  pro-  hold down  land prices would  be  to implement
gram implementation  is illustrated  by the use  noninflationary  monetary  and  fiscal  policies.
of production cost as a basis for farm price sup-  Moreover,  price  support  programs  such  as
ports.  Economists  have stressed  the practical  those  for  peanuts  and  tobacco  where  allot-
problems  of basing  support  price  on  cost be-  ments or production quotas are tied to the land
cause cost estimates vary widely among farms  inevitably lead to increases in land prices.
even within a given geographic area. However,  Second, much of the support for federal com-
the procedure is also indefensible  from a theo-  modity  programs  has  been  based  on  price
"Wolfe (p.  138) identifies four sources and types of nonmarket failure. They include "internalities and private goals (relating, for example, to agency budgets, tech-
nology, and  information acquisition  and control);  redundant and  rising costs;  derived externalities;  and distributional  inequity  (indexed on power,  as  well as  on
income or wealth)."
'6Dahlman demonstrates that one cannot determine empirically whether an observed real world externality constitutes a deviation from an attainable optimum and
concludes:  "You cannot show analytically  that the government,  in principle and in all cases,  handles externalities  better than the market; nor  can you  prove the
opposite...." (p.  156).  Concluding that government  intervention  is warranted  because  markets  do not conform to the standards  of the conceptual  model  of perfect
competition is "much like the judge who awarded  the prize to the second singer after having heard only the first contestant"  (Mitchell, p. 1).
""We  can prevent government  from serving special interests  only by depriving it  of the power  to use  coercion  in doing so, which  means that we can limit  the
powers of organized interests only by limiting the powers  of government....  If that power is unlimited,  it will and must be used in the service of particular interests,
and it will induce all the organizable interests to combine in order to bring pressure upon government" (Hayek,  1979, p. 16).
'8"Even if all citizens as consumers  stand to gain from a general policy  of non-intervention,  each citizen as employee or investor stands to gain from particular  inter-
ventions....  This dilemma  has recently led  Professor Hayek to explore the possibilities  of constitutions having two distinct representative  assemblies with different
tasks. One would be a true legislative body and the other concerned with government proper, i.e., everything except the making of laws.... The purpose of this separa-
tion of powers is, of course,  to create a legislature which  is not subservient to the momentary pressures of government,  and hence which severely  limits the response
which governments may make to immediate political pressures,  in order to protect the long-run interest of these same people" (Littlechild,  pp. 78-9).
33uncertainty  and  instability  in  agriculture.  CONCLUSIONS  AND IMPLICATIONS
There is no consensus among economists about
the costs and benefits of stable prices (Samuel-  Two  major  questions  or  problems  arise  in
son;  Waugh).  However,  here  again,  a  stable  analyzing potential policies  for southern  com-
economic environment quite likely is the great-  modities.  First, what would we as citizens act-
est  contribution  the  federal  government  can  ing  through our  political  representatives  like
make toward a reduction  in price uncertainty,  to achieve? As suggested heretofore,  price sup-
In  addition,  recent  experience  with the sugar  port programs  cannot achieve  the  conflicting
program,  the International  Coffee Agreement,  objectives  of  producers,  consumers,  and  tax-
and  government  management  of  CCC  wheat  payers.  For example,  although  income  trans-
stocks provides little support for the idea that  fers are often justified on egalitarian grounds,
government  can stabilize  commodity  prices.' 9 any program which supports producer incomes
Thus, on the basis  of past experience,  there is  through  product  price  will  provide  more
little  reason  to expect  government  stabiliza-  benefits  to higher  income  producers.  Income
tion  efforts  to  succeed  where  private  efforts  transfers  in  agriculture,  like  those  in  other
fail.  areas,  appear to be better explained by politi-
It  may be possible and feasible to further re-  cal power  than by the  public  goods  model  of
duce  price  uncertainty  through  market  mea-  welfare economics.  In view of imperfections  in
sures.  Hedging through  futures  markets,  for  the political process,  we cannot assume either
example, is one way to reduce the variability of  that  the  stated  purpose  of  legislation  is
returns,  and  these  markets  currently  play an  broadly  beneficial  or  that  actual  program
important role  in reducing the impact  of risk  results will be consistent with the stated legis-
and uncertainty. 2 0 Furthermore, there appears  lative purpose.2
to  be  considerable  potential  for  an  increased  The  second major problem is the limitations
role of futures markets.  of government.  It  is increasingly  being recog-
Finally,  given  the  U.S.'s  comparative  ad-  nized that there are limitations to what govern-
vantage  in  the production  of  farm  products,  ment can do. This attitude was well expressed
the farm  sector  potentially  has  more to gain  by  Hayek  (1975)  in  his  Nobel  Memorial
from freer  international  trade than  other  sec-  Lecture:
tors  of  the  economy.  Because  exports
constitute about  30 percent  of the market  for  "If man is not to do more harm than good
U.S.  farm  products,  protectionist  policies  in his efforts to improve the social order,
appear  to  be inconsistent  with  the  narrowly  he will have to learn that in this, as in all
conceived well-being of the farm sector as well  other fields where essential complexity of
as with that of the  nation at large  (Luttrell).  an organized kind prevails,  he cannot  ac-
Furthermore,  it  is  increasingly  important  to  quire  the  full  knowledge  which  would
recognize  that protection  for  single  products  make  mastery of the events possible.  He
can be  self-defeating  by triggering  retaliatory  will therefore have to use what knowledge
protective  measures  in other countries.  Farm  he can achieve, not to shape the results as
exports  as a percentage  of cash farm  receipts  the craftsman  shapes  his handiwork,  but
have only recently regained the levels that pre-  rather to cultivate a growth by providing
vailed  in the  early  1920s  before  the large  in-  the appropriate environment,  in the man-
creases  in tariffs  in the  1930s.  Wanniski  con-  ner in which the gardener uses this for his
tends that increased tariffs associated with the  plants" (p. 442).
Smoot-Hawley  tariff bill enacted in 1929 were
a key  factor in bringing  on  the stock  market  In  the evaluation  of various policy  alterna-
crash and the Great Depression. Regardless of  tives,  information  problems  and  problems  of
whether  this is true,  agriculture  clearly  has  a  implementation  are too often ignored  or mini-
substantial stake in freer international trade.  mized.  Externality problems  are "solved,"  for
'9"For example,  it was argued  for years that while the old sugar program raised U.S. prices above world prices most of the time, the program provided insurance
against fluctuations on the high side. Yet,  when world supplies shrank and prices exploded in  1974, the U.S. price went right up with it....  Similarly, the International
Coffee Agreement that we joined in 1975 was advertised as a stabilizing device,  yet when the Brazilian frost struck in July of that year,  it could do nothing to prevent
two years of high prices. Even in grains, where CCC stocks had helped in  smoothing out relatively minor price fluctuations in the 1960's, they were of little use when
stabilization was really  needed in the mid-1970's.  Indeed in  this episode it seems  clear that government was an important  agent of instability:  first through sub-
sidizing wheat exports in  1972, then by selling off stocks too quickly in 1973 and  1974 (it was not private speculators but our own CCC that mishandled this), then by
attempts to redress the error via export controls in 1973-1975,  and finally  by encouraging  farmers through 1976 to believe that a new era of high prices and prosper-
ity had dawned...thus  promoting the classic cob-web cycle of overproduction  in 1977"  (Gardner,  1979, pp. 166-7).
"Gardner  (1977) suggests hedging by means of commodity options as a way of providing farm income stabilization (but not farm income support).  A market in put-
options  does  not exist in  the U.S. because Congress banned  options trading in the major agricultural  commodities  in 1936.  The CCC  loan program is a  put-option
market provided by the government.
"Economists should not  assume that what government  does is an accurate  reflection of the "true social values of the country regardless of the economic conse-
quences....  Although corporations,  labor unions, farmer  organizations,  and consumer advocates  perform useful functions,  they are not innocent economic  agents, for
they do conspire to exact benefits for themselves  at the expense of others in the economy....  When economists merely accommodate governments,  they serve only to
rationalize what is being done and lose their potential as educators" (Schultz,  1978, p. 9).
34example, by suggesting a per unit tax equal to  were available to the government,  what is the
the difference  between  marginal  private  cost  basis for thinking that prices  would be  stabil-
and marginal social cost. As Hayek stressed a  ized more  effectively  in view of  the imperfec-
generation  ago,  however,  the  marginal  ef-  tions and uncertainty inherent  in the political
ficiency rules of theoretical welfare  economics  process?2 5
are  not directly  applicable  to  the  economic  Finally,  the  policy  analyst  should  not
problem  which  society  faces.22 Opportunity  assume that current programs and institutions
cost  is inherently  subjective,  and there  is  no  are unchangeable.2 6 Economists often feel con-
way to obtain the information needed to imple-  strained by realism considerations  in evaluat-
ment  such  efficiency  rules  (Buchanan,  1969).  ing  policy  alternatives  and  are  reluctant  to
Furthermore,  this  Pigouvian  approach  in-  suggest  policies  requiring  changes  that  are
volves the implicit assumption that the politi-  considered  impractical  or  unrealistic
cal  actors  who  devise  the  market-correcting  (Philbrook).  What  is  unrealistic  today,  how-
measures  "act solely  to maximize  social effic-  ever,  may become realistic tomorrow as people
iency  without  regard  to  their  own  utility,  acquire additional information about the costs
power,  prestige,  income  or  vote  appeal"  and benefits of alternative policies. In 1965, for
(Cheung,  p.  81).23  The evidence  strongly  sug-  example,  a  system  of  flexible  exchange  rates
gests,  however,  that self-interest  continues  to  was  considered  to  be  unrealistic  and  some
motivate  people  when  they  move  from  the  economists  were  chided  for  suggesting  the
market into politics or bureaucracy.24 systLn as  a  solution  to balance  of payments
Fluctuating prices for agricultural commodi-  problems.  A decade later,  a system of flexible
ties  bring  calls  for  government  stabilization  exchange  rates was in use.  So, in agriculture,
policies.  In such cases,  market results  should  the policy critique which appears unrealistic in
be compared with an attainable alternative.  In  terms of today's legislation  may, in reality, be
retrospect,  prices  often vary  more  than  they  relevant tomorrow. The economist can play an
would if speculators  were more farsighted.  Yet  important  role in analyzing both the effects of
what is the evidence  that government can ob-  existing  agricultural  programs  and the impli-
tain  better  information  than  market  cations  of  alternative  institutional  arrange-
participants?  Even  if  superior  information  ments (Buchanan, 1979).
""The  reason for this is that the 'data'  from which  the economic  calculus  starts are never for the whole society 'given'  to a single mind which could work out the
implications and  can never  be so given....  The economic  problem of society is thus not merely  a problem  of how  to allocate  'given'  resources-if 'given' is taken  to
mean given to a single mind which deliberately solves the problem set by these 'data.' It is rather a problem of how to secure the best use of resources known to any of
the members of society, for ends whose relative importance only these individuals know" (Hayek, 1948, pp. 77-8).
"Niskanen  has argued that because  power, prestige, and income  tend to be related to agency size, bureaucrats have an incentive to expand their budget which may
well lead to an overcorrection of any potential externality problem.
"Thus,  in  the economic theory of politics, there  is no presumption that politicians  and bureaucrats  are any  different from the rest of us. "It  is not an 'evil  man'
assumption. There is no implication at all that politicians  and bureaucrats behave  any differently from other people.  There is no implication  that they are grabbing,
self-interested, maximizing, squeezing, any more than you or I or anyone  else" (Buchanr  .', al.,  1978, p. 157).
"Gardner (1979)  cites two recent examples  where short-run political considerations dictated agricultural  r". cy.  "The period immediately  prior to the 1976 election
offers two telling examples of the role of political  calculation,  the decisions to raise  the loan rate of wheat i  . $1.50 to $2.25 per bushel,  and to triple the tariff  on
imported sugar from .625  to 1.875 cents per pound. The decisions were basically  political ones, and would not have been made had the election not loomed so large in
White House thinking" (p. 193).
More recently  in 1979, the Carter administration,  initially  opposed to federal loan guarantees  to the Chrysler Corporation, later insisted that the company take a
larger  package than it originally requested.  The change in  policy,  according to press reports,  was not  based on economic  conditions but was motivated  by 1980
political considerations.  In agriculture, the suspension of grain sales  to Russia by President  Carter (in January 1980) greatly increased price uncertainty in domestic
grain markets.
"6In the words of  Nobel Laureate T. W. Schultz:  "The core of my argument  is that one of the primary  functions of academic  economists is to question society's
institutions.  Economists  are all too complacent  about their freedom of inquiry. They  are not sufficiently  vigilant in  safeguarding their function as educators.  They
should give a high priority  to scholarly criticism of economic doctrines  and of society's institutions"  (1979, p. 17).
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